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Abstract 
Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely 
observed phenomenon across time and countries. This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-
division is known as the “work-division puzzle”. Gender differences regarding characteristics 
(preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized as competing 
explanations for this fact. We experimentally control for context and productivity to investigate 
preferences for work-division by true co-habiting couples, in a newly developed specialization task. 
Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. 
We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which corresponds to the 
traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. We show that women do not contribute 
more than men to the household public good whatever the situation. This result allows us to rule out some 
of the standard explanations of the work-division puzzle.  
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1. Introduction 
Labor specialization by men and women is widely observed across time and cultures (Blau and Kahn, 
2007). When living in a couple women, especially mothers, tend to withdraw from the labor market and 
focus on household work, whereas men tend to increase their hours of labor market work (e.g., Alger and 
Cox, 2012). Even in couples where the wife earns more than her husband, we usually still observe equal or 
even more investment by women in household public goods (Brines, 1994; Rizavi and Sofer, 2010; 
Sevilla-Sanz et al., 2010). This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-division is known as the 
“work-division puzzle”. Two factors could cause this phenomenon. Either net-benefits extracted from 
domestic work relative to labor market work differ between men and women.1 Given this ratio of net-
benefits, specialization would therefore be a sign of efficient resource allocation by the household. Or 
intrinsic gender norms lead women to contribute to the household public good (e.g., Greig and Bohnet, 
2009). In this case policies aimed at increasing female labor market participation might not be effective as 
long as they cannot overcome these norms. 
Theoretical household models give a framework that details how available time can be transformed into 
individual net-benefits in couples. The main mechanism for this is the household production concept 
(Becker, 1981; Gronau, 1977; Sofer, 1985). Similar to a public good, household services are produced 
using family members’ effort. However while public good dilemmas usually assume that the contribution 
of every member increases efficiency, this is not necessarily the case for household domestic goods. 
Productivity differences across household members might be causing the observed unequal work 
allocation in couples (e.g., Becker, 1981). Productivity at housework compared to labor market wages 
might be greater for women than for men. If women have a comparative advantage at home whereas their 
partners have a comparative advantage on the labor market, the efficient couples would choose a strongly 
gendered work-division. In such a case, efficient allocation of resources in the household causes gender 
specialization. When interested in work-division in families we therefore have to investigate how spouses 
interact in situations requiring task specialization. 
Investigating the causes of gender specialization in families is naturally constrained by the availability of 
information on relative domestic productivity levels. While productivity on the labor market can be easily 
approximated by observed wage rates, domestic productivity is difficult to measure. One of the rare 
exceptions is domestic production in agricultural economies. In addition even in cases where productivity 
is measurable, this does not imply that the affected household members are actually aware of these 
differences. The additional impact of social pressure through neighbors, colleagues or family members, is 
																																								 																				
1 Benefits can be material but might also be related to status or emotions. Benefits also have to be adjusted for either 
material or non-material costs.  
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even harder to control. Social pressure might indeed constitute a significant cost associated with 
deviations from gender norms. We therefore propose an experimental investigation into spouses’ behavior 
in an environment where a household public good can be produced and relative advantages are such that 
efficiency requires specialization. Our ‘specialization game’ will allow us to investigate the counterfactual 
where women earn more from non-public good investment than men, which corresponds to the work-
division puzzle. We can further eliminate the impact of social pressure by allowing for choices in an 
anonymous environment. Tasks requiring specialization, as we propose it, have not yet been 
experimentally studied. Since our specialization game is structured such that efficiency comes at the cost 
of inequality, a strong concern for efficiency is required by the disadvantaged player to make 
contributions to the public good. Family economics assumes such a strong efficiency interest among 
spouses.2  
The empirical evidence confirms that women contribute more to household public goods (for example 
childcare) than men (see Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Thomas, 1990, for developing countries; and 
Lunderg et al., 1997, for the U.K.).  Also women are often considered to be more caring, friendly and 
oriented towards cooperation than men (Balliet et al., 2011). Results from experimental social dilemma 
games among strangers sometimes supports this view and sometimes contradicts it. The reason seems to 
lie in a higher sensitivity to social context by women  (Ledyard, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009; Balliet et al., 2011). An important empirical question is, to which degree existing 
gender differences in social situations are shaped by society (through institutions, norms and social 
pressure) and to which degree they are internalized. The psychological costs of social pressure by being 
observed and judged, can have important consequences for behavior (e.g., Hoffman et al. 1994; Masclet et 
al., 2003). At the same time cognitive dissonance, due to not being able to comply with an internalized 
norm, can hurt the self-image and equally influence behaviors (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Murnighan 
et al., 2001). The origin of gender differences concerning altruism and cooperation has also been related to 
sociocultural or evolutionary arguments (Balliet et al., 2011; Alger and Cox, 2012). The general 
conclusion is that generalizable gender differences for behavior in social dilemmas are unlikely to exist 
and that an understanding of gender differences requires a separate analysis for different types of 
interactions and situations. Family interactions are both from an evolutionary and sociocultural 
perspective crucial for men and women. Controlled experiments on family interactions suggest so far that 
men care more for efficiency, whereas women tend to care more for equality (Beblo and Beninger, 2016; 
Kamas and Preston, 2012). Since in many experimental paradigms efficiency and equality are correlated, 
distinguishing these two motives requires a specific approach. 
																																								 																				
2 The existence of efficiency concerns among unrelated individuals has been suggested by Engelmann and Strobel, 
(2004) and Engelmann and Strobel (2006) and been discussed in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr et.al. (2006). 
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We study spouses’ behavior in a novel specialization task and compare behavior to a situation involving a 
standard voluntary contribution mechanism (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988). In both cases investment in the 
private good contributes to an increase in own payoff whereas investment in the public good leads to the 
production of a good equally distributed among spouses. The specialization task creates an asymmetric 
situation in which returns from the private good are higher for one of the spouses compared to his/her 
partner.3 The participant that will in the following be called “the advantaged player” will generate larger 
returns from private investment than from public good investment. If gender differences concerning public 
good contribution are internalized, we expect behavior in the experiment to reflect this and women to 
invest more in the public good, regardless of private returns. If gender differences do not concern public 
good contributions in general, but are rather related to efficiency and equality concerns, our design allows 
us to disentangle these. If however real world gender differences are mainly caused by external factors 
(differences in payoffs or social pressure), we expect that men and women will react in the same way to 
being in either the advantaged or disadvantaged position.4  
Previous experimental studies on couples’ behavior in social dilemmas have rejected the idea that 
maximal efficiency is achieved (Cochard et al., 2016; Iversen et al., 2011; Ashraf, 2009; Mani, 2008). 
Nevertheless relatively high efficiency levels are observed and a significant proportion of couples 
maximizes efficiency. However, by definition, social dilemmas are structured such that contribution to the 
public good implies maximization of efficiency. Our specialization game presents a situation where for the 
“advantaged” spouse, private investment is maximizing own payoffs but also efficient for the household. 
Thus our design eliminates the dilemma nature for the advantaged spouse if he aims at own payoff 
maximization and efficiency. However if spouses care at the same time for efficiency and for equality of 
earnings from the game, this creates a new sort of dilemma. The advantaged player has to trade-off 
maximizing household income or equalizing private payoffs for both partners. As previously discussed, 
spouses have been observed to show a concern for equality of earnings and might thus face this type of 
dilemma. 
Our results show that couples react to inequalities concerning private returns in the expected way: namely 
the advantaged spouse (i.e. the one with higher private returns) reduces his/her investment in the public 
good and increases his investment in the private good. We further observe that the inequality concerning 
private returns causes symmetric behavior dependent on whether either the man or the woman has a 
																																								 																				
3 Specialization in couples has also been studied by Goerges (2015), however, for a task where spouses jointly decide 
whether to specialize or not and who of the two partners should take the role of the ‘advantaged’ player. 
4 In other domains (Gneezy et al, 2009) it has been shown that gender differences can be inverted given different 
institutions. Specifically it was observed that the generally believed greater competitiveness of men disappears in a 
matriarchic culture.  
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higher private return. Our results thus support in a lab setting the theoretical assumption that labor 
specialization by spouses is mainly driven by differences in net-benefits from labor market activity, and 
are not a result of gender specific preferences concerning public good contributions. We further observe a 
tendency for higher efficiency among men and for more equality among women. We test the robustness of 
our results by comparing behavior in an abstract task where contributions are defined by the allocation of 
points and a time allocation task, where contributions depend on actual time invested. Time allocation 
might provide a more intuitive context to the dilemma (e.g., Loomes, 1999) and thus increases the external 
validity of our results. Our results concerning gender differences are not affected by this framing however 
we observe overall higher efficiency levels under the time allocation framing. 
2. Task and predictions: 
To study the impact of comparative advantages for men or women we will introduce a “specialization 
task”. In this two-player game, efficiency is reached when only one of the two players (the 
“disadvantaged” player) contributes his entire endowment to a public good. Since public good production 
is equally distributed on both players, efficiency leads to inequality in earnings. As a baseline we will use 
a standard two-person public good game that we will describe first. 
2.1. Baseline: the symmetric public good game 
In the baseline symmetric public good game spouses receive an initial endowment of 20 units and are 
asked to decide concerning its allocation on either a private or public account. Each unit invested in the 
public account returns 1.2 as much as one unit invested in the private account. Returns from the public 
account are equally split across the two spouses. Earnings of a player investing cs (i.e. contribution by self) 
in the public good where the partner contributes cp to the public good are calculated as follows5: 
 ys = 10 (20 – cs) + 6 (cs + cp) (1) 
As usual in these kinds of dilemmas, efficiency would be reached if players chose to cooperate, namely 
contributing all their endowment to the public good (cs=20; cp=20). The Nash-equilibrium predicts mutual 
defection for two selfish individuals (cs=0; cp=0) in a one-shot interaction and this corresponds to the 
lowest earnings for both players. Since even strangers present other-regarding preferences in these types 
of games, we expect this phenomenon to be even stronger for couples.6 In Cochard et al. (2016) spouses 
																																								 																				
5 We present here the actual point earnings also used in the experiment. To avoid calculations with fractions, each 
unit invested in the private account returns 10 experimental units, and each unit invested in the public good returns 6 
experimental units to each of the two spouses. 
6 In a preceding article, we discuss how model predictions are affected when participants in the experiment are true 
couples. Efficiency is reached more easily because of two phenomena: a strong aversion to payoff inequality within 
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played a discrete prisoners’ dilemma once with their partner and once with a stranger of the opposite sex. 
The maximization of joint earnings (implying that both spouses cooperate) occurred more frequently in 
couples than when strangers play together. In the case of our symmetric game, predictions of individual 
behavior dependent on three extreme cases of social preferences are summarized in Table 1. An own-
payoff maximizing agent (pure selfishness) would contribute nothing to the public good (cs = 0). A player 
who aims at maximizing spouse’s payoff (extreme altruism) would do the opposite (cs = 20). Finally, a 
purely inequality averse agent would always act as he believes his/her partner to do in order to minimize 
the difference in earnings. Denoting self-beliefs about the partner’s contribution: Bcp, he simply 
contributes: cs = Bcp. 
2.2 Specialization game 
The specialization game reflects the puzzle that occurs when a couple makes a work-division choice. For 
one player, the “advantaged” one, the choice of not investing in the public good is efficient, the individual 
interest and the couples interest are thus aligned. This could be viewed as the choice of specializing in 
labor market work instead of contributing to household production when having a higher labor market 
wage rate.7 On the contrary, the “disadvantaged” player will have to make a choice that leads to a dilemma 
between his/her self-interest and the couple’s interest. This corresponds to the choice of specialization in 
household work for the partner who has lower labor market earnings. In this case efficiency and equality 
are in conflict. The efficient solution in the specialization game is also the most unequal one. 
Concretely, as in the baseline game, each individual is endowed with 20 units that have to be allocated 
between a private and a public account. Earnings from the public account are the same as in the case 
discussed above. However, earnings from the private account are not the same for both partners. 
Specifically one of the two players is advantaged and earns from his private account 1.3 times more than 
the other player. Denoting cs (resp. cp), the contribution by self (resp. partner) to the public account, 
individual earnings in the case where self is advantaged are computed as follows: 
𝑦!!"#!$%!&'"       = 13 20 −  𝑐! +  6 𝑐! + 𝑐! 𝑦!!"#$!%$&'$()!   = 10 20 −  𝑐! +  6 𝑐! + 𝑐!  (2) 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
the couple and the presence of a micro-norm of sharing which contaminates the way individual payoffs are 
transformed into individual welfare. Because couples have interactions outside of the laboratory (essentially 
consumption sharing habits) the control of individual payoffs remains imperfect and this generates a complexity in 
the analysis that we chose not to integrate in this article. The interested reader can refer to Cochard et al. (2016) and 
consider that an income-pooling micro-norm would generate a preference for efficiency during the experiment. 
7 In real life, such specialization could also be due to lower household productivity or to social pressure inflicting 
additional costs. 
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Predictions according to different kinds of social preferences are presented in Table 1. 
In the asymmetric case, an advantaged player that aims at maximizing the joint earnings of the couple (i.e. 
pure efficiency seeking) should invest all of his units in his private account (cs=0). A disadvantaged 
partner that aims at maximizing joint earnings of the couple should still invest all units in the public 
account (cs=20). In contrast, an own payoff maximizing agent will never contribute to the public good 
(cs=0). A player who aims at maximizing his spouse’s payoff would fully contribute (cs=20).  
A pure inequality averse agent will act in a way to minimize the difference in earnings (i.e. min |ys - yp|), 
thus acting in function of his/her beliefs of the partner’s action, denoted Bcp. The advantaged spouse will 
in this case choose: 
 𝑐! = !"!" +  !"!"  𝓑𝑐! (3) 
Thus an advantaged individual who is intra-household income inequality adverse contributes despite this 
solution being not efficient. A purely inequality adverse, disadvantaged spouse will choose: 
𝑐! = −6 + !"!"  𝓑𝑐!    𝑖𝑓 𝓑𝑐! >  !"!"0                          𝑖𝑓  𝓑𝑐! ≤  !"!"  (4) 
In other words: such a player will not contribute to the public good if he believes his partner’s contribution 
will be too small (i.e. lower than 5). 
We can imagine linear combinations of any combination of these four extreme strategies (selfish, altruist, 
efficiency seeker and inequality averse). In this case we might want to differentiate between preferences 
that give relative stronger weight to self (i.e. ys ) of the form: 𝑈! = 𝛼 𝑦! +  𝛽 𝑦! + 𝑦! − 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 𝑦! − 𝑦!    (5) 
and preferences that give relatively stronger weight to the other (i.e. yp ) of the form:  𝑈! = 𝛾 𝑦! +  𝛿 𝑦! + 𝑦! − 1 − 𝛾 − 𝛿 𝑦! − 𝑦!   (6) 
with 0 ≤ 𝛼,𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿 ≤ 1, where 𝛼 and 𝛾 indicate the weight of own (equation 5) and partners (equation 6) 
earnings, respectively. And where 𝛽 and 𝛿 indicate the additional weight of joint earnings.  
While it is difficult to distinguish between preference for equality and efficiency in general social dilemma 
games, our specialization task allows us to do so. Figure 4:A illustrates strategies given an individual’s 
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beliefs about his partner’s behavior for a player in either an advantaged or disadvantaged position. The 
shaded area in the left panel indicates belief-choice combinations that are consistent with a function of the 
form 𝑈! (i.e. some selfish concern). The shaded area in the right panel indicates combinations consistent 
with a function of type 𝑈! (i.e. some altruism concern). To investigate the type of preferences in couples 
we also elicit beliefs among spouses about their partners’ actions.  
To investigate the symmetry and robustness of our results concerning the behavior of spouses we will 
consider a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 design. Two of these treatment variations are on a between-subject level and will 
be described first. The others are on an in-subject level and will be discussed afterwards.8  
On a between-subject level we will compare treatments where either the man or the woman is advantaged. 
This will allow us to compare a situation where men have a comparative advantage with the 
counterfactual where women have the comparative advantage concerning the private good. We further 
study both spouses (Spouses) and unrelated individuals (Control) that are randomly matched with a 
partner of the opposite sex to form a pair. For all treatments and numbers of observations see Table 2. 
In an in-subject design we further compare the baseline game with the specialization game described 
above. We observe three different framings of these games to control for their abstraction level. In two of 
them spouses decide how to allocate 5 minutes of time between two abstract work tasks (A and B), one 
leading to production of the private and the other of the public good. In treatment No Leisure these were 
the only two options available. In treatment Leisure a leisure option was available and thus work required 
some effort. We finally compare these to an abstract treatment (Abstract), where spouses are asked to 
invest tokens in either a project A or B.  
3. Experimental protocol 
The experiment was conducted in June 2010 and September 2016 in the laboratory of experimental 
economics at the Toulouse School of Economics. An overall of 238 participants took part in the study. Of 
these 128 were recruited as co-habiting, heterosexual couples (i.e. 64 couples). Another 110 unrelated 
participants were recruited for control sessions. The experiment was computerized and the interface was 
programmed in Visual Basic. Participating couples were recruited by newspaper reports about the ongoing 
study, flyers and information provided on a website. The recruitment information for spouses specified 
that heterosexual couples, more than 20 years old were invited to participate in a study of economic 
decisions by couples. Couples were required to live together for at least one year (but did not need to be 
																																								 																				
8 A further control for spouses concerned whether earnings where private or known to the partner. Results from these 
sessions (another 22 couples) will not be discussed in this paper.  
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married) and invited to sign up jointly for one two-hour session. Control participants were recruited 
through the standard participant database of the laboratory; they were not required to have a partner or to 
be married. 
For spouses mean age by men and women was 37 and 35 years, respectively. Partners had been living 
together for an average of 10 years, 60% of our participating couples were married or under civil union 
(PACS) and 41% had at least one child living in their household. Summary statistics can be found in Table 
3. Participants in the control sessions were younger and mostly students. 
In total 27 sessions (11 control; 16 spouses) were conducted with at least 3 and at most 6 couples present. 
Great care was taken to explain each part of the instructions as simple as possible and screens were 
presented in a graphically intuitive way (see Appendices A and B). 
Upon arrival participants were invited to a reception room that provided some refreshments and journals. 
When all participants had arrived, we announced that the study was about to begin and that participants 
should not communicate in the lab. Control participants were informed that the study required an even 
number of men and women to participate. Cubicles were designated for men or women respectively. This 
ensured that partners could not communicate or observe each other during the study. Control participants 
were informed that they had been randomly matched with a partner of the opposite sex to form a couple. 
They were not informed who this partner was. Instructions were then the same as in the treatments with 
spouses. 
The study consisted of four experimental parts and a questionnaire part. The timeline of the different parts 
of the study is described in Table 4. Instructions to the different parts of the experiment were always read 
aloud. Participants were actively encouraged to ask questions if something was not clear to them. After 
instructions were read, a short summary of the instructions was displayed on screen and participants had to 
answer a short control question to test their understanding. When participants had finished reading the 
summary, and correctly answered the control question, they were invited to enter their decision on screen. 
Initial instructions informed participants that they were about to participate in a study on decision making 
in which they have to make a number of decisions. It was explained that the study would consist of a 
number of separate parts, each part consisting of one or more decisions to be taken. Earnings from the 
experiment were calculated in an experimental currency: Francs Toulousains (FT).9 It was stressed that 
decisions were individual, private and anonymous with respect to the experimenters, to other participants 
and their partner.  
																																								 																				
9 The exchange rate to Euros was in the sessions for spouses: 20 FT=1 euro. It was adjusted for the student subject 
pool to 40 FT = 1 euro to represent standard experimental earnings from participation.  
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About half of the participants were further in a treatment favoring men (M), the other were in a treatment 
favoring women (F). In the initial instructions it was made clear that the “advantaged” participants would 
throughout the experiment have higher earning possibilities.  
The experiment consisted of three parts. In each of the three parts couples were presented with the 
decision problems described above concerning investment in either a public or private account. In the first 
part (treatment Abstract) investment was represented in an abstract way using points that could be 
allocated to either account, denoted A and B to participants.  All participants had 20 points at their 
disposal.  In parts two (Leisure) and three (No Leisure) investment was represented in a more concrete 
way using a time period of 5 minutes (20 intervals of 15 seconds) during which participants worked on a 
task associated with either account. The difference between the two parts consisted in the fact that in part 
two (Leisure) a leisure task was available.10 This leisure task consisted in the option to surf the Internet. 
Inactivity in the effort tasks was considered as leisure and led automatically to a web-browser allowing for 
Internet access.  
The order of the three parts was always the same. The part including leisure was presented before the part 
without leisure to make participants as unsuspicious as possible about the presence of the leisure option. 
Specifically we wanted to ensure that participants felt that this environment was natural and that they 
would not feel inhibited to use the opportunity for leisure. In part three no leisure option was available, 
and therefore decisions only concerned the allocation of 5 minutes of time between the two options 
without imposing effort. 
In each part the baseline and specialization task were presented. Investment in the private account led to 
private earnings of the individual, investment in the public account led to the production of a public good 
that was equally redistributed among the partners. Earnings from the public account were the same in both 
																																								 																				
10 Concretely, in parts two (Leisure) and three (No Leisure), both tasks were identical and, denoted as A and B. They 
both consisted of copying phone numbers from a list but corresponded to either a public or a private investment with 
different pay-offs for the individual and the couple. Payment for both tasks was by time spent on the task and not by 
quantity or quality of the work done. By doing so we exclude productivity differences due to different ability levels. 
Participants were paid by interval of 15 seconds, for a total endowment of 5 minutes (i.e., 20 x 15 seconds = 300 
seconds). Participants could switch back and forth between tasks and payment was calculated by the total amount of 
time spend on either task. The task was rather easy and participants had a 3 minutes time interval to familiarize 
themselves with the task and the computer interface that allowed switching between the different options.  
In part three (No Leisure) payment was not dependent on effort (having actually worked and typed numbers) but 
solely on the time the participant chose to spend on the computer interface corresponding to either task. The whole 
time endowment was therefore allocated between the public or private account. In part two (Leisure) this was not 
necessarily the case: specifically inactivity was considered as leisure and therefore not counted in either account.  
While working, participants could see in real-time how much time they had left and how much time they had already 
spent on the two tasks.  
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tasks only earnings from the private account varied for the advantaged player.11 The advantaged player 
was in all three parts either the man or the woman in the couple. 
Final earnings were determined by one randomly selected game out of each part plus earnings from belief 
elicitation questions.12 Participants were not informed which games were chosen and could therefore not 
deduce from earnings the actions of their partner. Each player was privately informed about his/her 
earnings and received a private cash envelope. 
4. Results 
4.1. Choices 
We first focus on the sustainability of task specialization during the experiment (see Figure 1 and Table 
5). Average contributions among spouses to the public good in the baseline public good situation are 
across framings 16.2 (5.0)13 (in the control group: 8.9 (6.3)). As expected, contributions are not different 
for advantaged or disadvantaged players (Mann Whitney14 by advantage, separately for men and women15, 
each framing, and spouses and control).16 In the specialization game spouses with low returns from the 
private good invest about 16.0 (5.1) of their available resources in the public good (control: 5.5 (6.1)). By 
contrast spouses that have higher returns from their private good invest only 4.4 (5.5) of their resources in 
the public good (control: 3.2 (3.8)). This difference is highly significant for spouses (p < 0.000 for both 
men and women and each framing), which can be easily observed from the difference in distributions 
(Figure 2). In the control group, differences between advantaged and disadvantaged players are much less 
pronounced. We observe a small difference for women (respect. 2.1 (2.6) vs. 5.6 (6.0) across framings, p 
< 0.05 in Abstract and No leisure, p = 0.200 in Leisure); for men, contributions are not statistically 
significantly different for advantaged versus disadvantaged players (respect. 4.1 (4.4) vs. 5.5 (6.5) across 
																																								 																				
11 In the baseline game each point / time interval invested in the private account earned 10 experimental currency 
units, and each point / time interval invested in the public account returned 6 experimental currency units to each 
partner. In the specialization game one of the two partners earned for each point / time interval invested in the private 
account 13 experimental currency units (i.e., the 'advantaged' player) while the other received only 10 experimental 
currency units.  
12 Before final payout participants entered a chat phase (Part 5, see Table 4). This phase allows us to observe possible 
transfers between partners after finishing the experiment. Specifically partners were given the option to decide to 
allocate part of their earnings to a common envelope if desired. Results are not discussed in this paper.   
13 Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
14 Unless otherwise stated, tests are two-sided. 
15 It is not possible to treat all data (n = 128) as independent observations as each spouse’s decision is clearly not 
independent from his/her partner’s decision. Thus, we carry out tests on each sex separately (n = 64 observations for 
each). 
16 The overall high contributions in the baseline could be also due to other characteristics that make participating 
spouses different from standard subject pools: notably their age, income or education level.  
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framings). Indeed for control participants the distribution of individual contributions is very similar for 
advantaged and disadvantaged players across framings (see Figure 2).  
Efficiency in the specialization task requires that the advantaged player does not contribute, while the 
disadvantaged player contributes. Spouses reach in the baseline and the specialization task, a mean 
efficiency level17 of about 80% (see Table 6). There are no significant differences in efficiency between 
framings (all framings, baseline versus specialization task, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test on 
couple efficiency rates, n.s.). Efficiency levels are also not different for advantaged versus disadvantaged 
players (Mann Whitney by advantage, separately for men and women, each framing, n.s.). In the control 
treatment efficiency levels are significantly lower than in the spouses treatment (p=0.000), except in the 
specialization task with advantaged players. Indeed advantaged control participants in the specialization 
game, are extremely efficient (i.e. contribute nothing to the public good), which results in a higher level of 
efficiency in the specialization task than in the baseline (84.0% vs. 46.4%, p = 0.000). 
On a couple level more than 70% of spouses have a mean efficiency level equal or above 70% (each 
framing and both games, see Figure 3). Control couples only reach in about a quarter of the cases an 
efficiency level above 70%. Our first result is therefore the following: 
Result 1: Spouses react to the asymmetry in returns from the private good in the specialization task. 
Advantaged spouses reduce their investment in the public good and disadvantaged spouses invest as much 
as in the baseline task. As a result efficiency is at the same level in the baseline and the specialization 
task. Control participants reach significantly lower efficiency levels. In the specialization task, 
advantaged and disadvantaged control participants decrease their investment into the public good.  
As a result, compared to control participants, spouses reach relatively high efficiency levels in the 
specialization task. This result is in line with our previous work on French spouses playing a prisoners’ 
dilemma, where 72.5% of spouses cooperated (Cochard et al., 2016). This is also similar to the results 
from a dictator-game style distribution task administered at the end of the session (part 4, reported in 
Beblo et al., 2015). In this abstract task an average efficiency level of around 75% was observed. 
Furthermore, our earlier results showed that spouses react symmetrically to inequality in the abstract 
distribution task. Specifically men and women acted the same and treated situations where they were 
themselves in either the advantaged or disadvantaged position similarly.  
																																								 																				
17 Efficiency for disadvantaged players is computed as their investment in the public account (i.e. their contribution) 
divided by 20. For advantaged players, efficiency equals their investment in the private account divided by 20. In the 
Abstract and No leisure treatments, investment in the private account equals 20 minus investment in the public 
account; in the Leisure treatment this is not necessarily the case as subjects may have used the leisure option. The 
couple’s efficiency rate is simply the mean efficiency rate of the spouses. 
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Having observed the specialization by spouses but not by control participants, we can now compare the 
situation where men are advantaged with the counterfactual where women are advantaged. For this we 
will compare behavior by men and women that are in the same role (either advantaged or disadvantaged). 
We first compare average public good contributions across frames. For spouses we observe no significant 
difference across gender (for either role (advantaged, disadvantaged) and either game (baseline, 
specialization)). Thus we observe no consistent gender difference in behavior for spouses. If we analyze 
each frame separately (see Figure 1) we observe significance for disadvantaged spouses in the baseline 
game both in the leisure (men: 17.7 (5.7); women: 15.4 (7.0); p = 0.097) and no leisure (men: 18.5 (4.3); 
women: 15.3 (7.5); p = 0.038) frames, and in the specialization game for advantaged spouses in the leisure 
frame (men: 1.7 (4.2); women: 5.0 (7.6); p = 0.046) and for disadvantaged spouses in the no leisure frame 
(men: 17.9 (5.9); women: 14.9 (7.5); p = 0.049). Therefore there are some differences between men and 
women, with a slight tendency for men to be more efficient but it should be noticed that in all cases these 
differences are of relatively small magnitude. Control participants show no significant gender differences 
if we compare average contributions across frames in the baseline. In the specialization task male 
advantaged players contribute marginally significantly more than female advantaged players (men: 4.1 
(4.4); women: 2.1 (2.6); p=0.070) but disadvantaged players show no significant difference. Our second 
result is therefore: 
Result 2: Overall, men and women react in the same way to being in either the advantaged or 
disadvantaged position, both for spouses and control participants. Across frames we observe no gender 
differences concerning investment in the public good. 
Thus contrary to theories that ascribe specialization to internalized norms, we observe no evidence of 
women investing more in the public good than men. For spouses both men and women contribute around 
80% of their resources to the public good when in the disadvantaged position, and around 20% when in 
the advantaged position. Our results therefore support in an abstract laboratory setting the theoretical 
assumption that labor specialization by spouses is driven by differences in net-benefits from labor market 
activity. The observed gender differences should thus be ascribed to differences in these net-benefits and 
not to gender specific differences.  
Overall our results are robust across the different frames. Notably across roles and games, average 
contributions are not different in frames Leisure and no Leisure.18 For spouses and control participants, 
																																								 																				
18 Specifically when doing all pairwise comparisons in 14 out of 16 cases we observe no significant difference, and 
we observe a small difference in two cases (specialization game for disadvantaged men (Leisure: 16.5 (6.9); No 
Leisure: 17.9 (5.9); p=0.025) for spouses, and advantaged women (Leisure: 2.4 (3.3); No Leisure: 1.3 (2.2); p=0.009) 
in the control). 
14	
	
average use of leisure is about 1% of the time endowment (3.2 seconds), which explains the lack of a 
difference.19  The abstract frame led to slightly different reactions, however both of our results hold for it 
too. Specifically in a number of instances the Abstract frame shows for spouses significantly lower 
efficiency rates compared to either the Leisure or no Leisure frame. However due to the fact that this 
frame was always presented before the others, we cannot rule out that learning was causing this effect. 
From the histograms of investment choices (Figure 2) we see that the Abstract frame leads to more 
choices of focal numbers (5, 10 and 15). In the control group the effect is rather inverted, leading in the 
baseline to higher efficiency rates in the abstract frame (see Figure 1).  
We further might wonder whether certain couple characteristics influence our main results. Possible 
variables for this could be the fact of having children or the relative bargaining power of spouses. We 
therefore verify results 1 and 2, comparing spouses with and without children. Both results also hold in 
this case. We also asked participants about their own salary and how much they believed their partner to 
earn. We can thus also compare participants that believe their partner to earn more with those that believe 
their partner earns less. Again both our results hold for either type of participant. 
4.2. Preferences 
Choices lead in the specialization task as well as in the baseline, to efficiency levels of around 80%. We 
might however wonder whether this can be ascribed to preferences for efficiency or to preferences for 
equality given optimistic beliefs about the partner. Given that our results are qualitatively not altered by 
the framing of investment, we will in the following concentrate on results from the no leisure treatment to 
investigate the relationship between beliefs and actions. The following results also hold when results from 
either of the other treatments are used. 
A large proportion of participants (almost 70%) act in a fully efficiency maximizing way. About 20% of 
participants (i.e. 33 individuals) split their investment between the two investment options. We will use 
beliefs to investigate if these choices can be interpreted as stemming from inequality aversion. Beliefs are 
plotted against own actions for advantaged and disadvantaged players in Figure 4 (B). The top panels 
show results from the baseline task. Indeed we see that a large proportion of observations falls close to the 
45° line for both spouses and control participants. In this task, about 62% of spouses contributed 20 and 
declared that they believed that their partner contributed 20. This proportion was much lower for control 
participants (advantaged: 24%, disadvantaged: 11%). However since the baseline game is symmetric, this 
																																								 																				
19 Across treatments men and women typed approximately eight ten-digit phone numbers per minute (i.e., about 80 
keystrokes per minute). This suggests that subjects felt as much compelled to provide an effort in treatment No 
Leisure than in treatment Leisure, although no sanction actually existed in the former.   
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might be an indication of concerns for efficiency, for equality or alternatively be the result of a social 
projection bias (e.g., Glaeser et al, 2000; Sapienza et al., 2013). The projection bias is the belief that 
people close to us will act like us. The specialization task requires a bit more cognitive effort by the 
participant to understand the incentive situation of their partner. Our results (Figure 4(B), bottom panel) 
confirm that participants do not simply project their own actions on their beliefs about their partner. 
Among spouses a large proportion of advantaged participants (30 out of 64) and disadvantaged 
participants (35 out of 64) reports beliefs that in combination with their own choice led to maximal 
efficiency and that are largely asymmetric in actions. Among control participants only 6 (out of 110) 
participants report beliefs that in combination with their own choice imply maximal efficiency. 
The density distribution plots in Figure 4(B) also allow us a comparison with the characterization of 
preferences (Figure 4(A)). We notice that for spouses in the specialization game the large majority of 
observations for advantaged players, 82.8%, fall in the area compatible with functions of type 𝑈! 
(combination of motives with some selfish concern). While the large proportion of observation for 
disadvantaged players, 85.9%, falls in the area that is consistent with a function of type 𝑈! (combination 
of motives with some altruistic concern). Since the role of advantaged player was randomly allocated and 
equally distributed over the two sexes, it seems unrealistic to assume that advantaged players are more 
selfish while disadvantaged players more altruistic. The more likely interpretation is that for both types of 
players a mix of efficiency and equality concerns influence behavior. This is in line with earlier results 
that observe a trade-of between efficiency and equality in couples.  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents experimental results concerning work-division choices made by true couples. We 
observe behavior in a specialization task and compare choices to a baseline public good task. The 
specialization task is meant to simulate the dilemma between family and work life experienced by many 
couples. In addition, it allows us to study the counterfactual where men are in a disadvantaged position 
concerning their private earnings which occurs in some non-traditional “power couples” (Bloemen and 
Stancanelli, 2015). The efficient outcome is such that one member will increase his private earnings from 
choosing the efficient option (i.e., specializes into labor market work), whereas the other sacrifices private 
earnings in order to invest in the household public good (i.e., specializes into household work). We test the 
robustness of our results given different framings of the investment task (time allocation or abstract 
investment).  
Couples react in the expected way in the specialization task. Their behavior is largely compatible with the 
predictions. Efficiency levels are in the baseline and in the specialization task at about 80%. In particular, 
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advantaged players reduce their contribution to the public good and disadvantaged players maintain their 
contributions largely unchanged. The baseline versus specialization task comparison did not show a 
change in efficiency despite the increase of inequality at the household level in the specialization task. 
This striking result is compatible with the existence of an intrinsic coordination mechanism among 
couples unrelated to inequality in earnings. An income-pooling micro-norm could play such a role (see 
Beblo and Beninger, 2016; Cochard et al., 2016).  
We observe no significant gender differences. Men and women react almost the same to being in either 
the advantaged or disadvantaged position in the specialization task. Hence, our results support in an 
abstract laboratory setting the theoretical assumption that labor specialization by spouses is driven by 
differences in net-benefits from labor market activity. Contrary to real-life, the work-division puzzle does 
not appear in the experiment. The fact that many real life tasks involve very different skills and different 
cultural norms are at play might further be influential for spouses behavior outside of the laboratory. Both 
the value that men and women attribute to the specific service produced at home (e.g., education of a 
child) and social pressure with respect to gender norms of who should do these tasks, might influence the 
relative costs and benefits in addition to salaries. The division of real life tasks is also often not as explicit 
as the division of a sum of money, but spontaneous (e.g., who gets up from the table to calm a crying 
baby). Some evidence that spontaneous decisions might differ from deliberate allocation choices, can be 
drawn from our comparison of an abstract frame with the time allocation frames. Indeed efficiency by 
spouses is higher in the time allocation frames, potentially because they pay less attention to the exact 
values and thus react in a more spontaneous fashion. 
Most notably, our experiment shows, that women do not have a higher intrinsic preference for investing in 
an abstract public good for a household.   
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Tables and Figures 
FIGURE 1: Contributions to public good by gender in baseline and specialization task.  
 
Note that in baseline no player was advantaged but that nevertheless one of the two players knew that he 
would be advantaged throughout the experiment. Stars indicate p values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
on differences in framing (* < 0.1; ** < 0.05). 
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FIGURE 2: Histogram of investment by advantaged and disadvantaged players in specialization task  
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FIGURE 3: Distribution of mean efficiency reached by couples in baseline and specialization task. 	
	
Note: Efficiency for disadvantaged players is computed as their investment in the public account (i.e. their 
contribution) divided by 20. For advantaged players, efficiency equals their investment in the private account 
divided by 20. In the Abstract and No leisure treatments, investment in the private account equals 20 minus 
investment in the public account; in the Leisure treatment this is not necessarily the case as subjects may have used 
the leisure option. The couple’s efficiency rate is simply the mean efficiency rate of the spouses. 
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FIGURE 4: Actions versus beliefs concerning spouses’ actions (A) predictions (B) density distribution 
plots (Sunflower plots) of stated beliefs and own choices in the no Leisure frame. 
(A)	Theoretical	predictions	–	specialization	task	
	
(B)	Own	investment	versus	beliefs	in	no	Leisure	frame.	Baseline	and	specialization	task.	
spouses	
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
disadvantaged player
control	
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
advantaged player
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
disadvantaged player
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
advantaged player
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
advantaged player
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
disadvantaged player
spouses	 control	
baseline:	
specializa1on	task:	
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
advantaged player
0
5
10
15
20
Ow
n 
inv
es
tm
en
t in
 p
ub
lic
 g
oo
d
0 5 10 15 20
Belief of partners investment
1 obs. 1 petal = 1 obs. 1 petal = 5 obs.
disadvantaged player
25	
	
TABLE 1: Predictions dependent on preferences	
 
	 selfishness 
max ys 
altruism 
max yp 
efficiency seeking 
max (ys + yp) 
inequality aversion 
min |ys-yp| 
Baseline task     
	 cs = 0	 cs = 20	 cs = 20	 cs = Bcp	
Specialization task 
If advantaged:	 cs = 0	 cs = 20	 cs = 0	 cs = 60/13 + (10/13)Bcp	
If disadvantaged:	 cs = 0	 cs = 20	 cs = 20	           -6 + (13/10)Bcp if Bcp > 60/13 
cs = 
           0                        if Bcp ≤ 60/13	
ys denotes the pay-off for self, yp partner’s pay-off and Bcp the belief concerning spouse’s contribution. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Overview of between-subject treatments 
 
Note: Other sessions were carried out but due to software problems results are not reported here. 
 Control Spouses 
M advantaged and 
F disadvantaged 
30 pairs 
60 participants 
32 couples 
64 participants 
F advantaged and 
M disadvantaged 
25 pairs 
50 participants 
32 couples 
64 participants 
 
 
55 pairs 
110 participants 
64 couples 
128 participants 
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TABLE 3: Socio-demographic variables of spouses (64 couples) 
 
 Mean (std dev)    
Married (dummy) 0.45 0.49    
Civil contract (dummy) 0.16 0.36    
Age - men 36.86 11.88    
Age - women 35.30 12.16    
Years as couple 10.02 11.85    
Children living in household (dummy) 0.41 0.49    
 
	
	
TABLE 4:	Timeline	of	experimental	sessions	 	
Welcome and general instructions 
 
Part 1: Abstract  
   situation 1. Baseline:			 	 i) action, ii) beliefs 
   situation 2. Specialization task: 	 i) action, ii) beliefs 
 
Familiarization with time allocation task 
 
Part 2: Leisure 
   situation 1: Baseline: 		 	 i) action, ii) beliefs 
   situation 2: Specialization task: 	 i) action, ii) beliefs 
 
Part 3: No Leisure 
   situation 1:  Baseline: 	 	 i) action, ii) beliefs 
   situation 2:  Specialization task: 	 i) action, ii) beliefs 
 
Part 4: Individual decision task(*) 
   i) actions, ii) beliefs partner, iii) beliefs population 
 
Part 5: Chat phase in couple  
 
Socio-demographic questionnaire  
 
Payout (private or public) and good bye 
   
(*) Part 4 and 5 are not used in this paper. Results from part 4 are discussed as the ‘French’ sample in Beblo 
et al. (2015). 
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TABLE 5: Average investment levels (out of 20 units) in public good across all treatments  
 
 
 
Baseline:
F: 
N=32
M: 
N=32
F: 
N=25
M: 
N=30
F M F: 
N=32
M: 
N=32
F: 
N=30
M: 
N=25
F M F M F M
Abstract 15.0 15.9 9.9 11.2 0.01 0.00 15.5 15.1 8.5 12.1 0.00 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Leisure 15.3 17.2 9.2 8.0 0.00 0.00 15.4 17.7 6.0 9.3 0.00 0.00 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
No Leisure 16.5 17.0 9.3 8.3 0.00 0.00 15.3 18.5 7.4 8.7 0.00 0.00 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
All 15.6 16.7 9.5 9.1 0.00 0.00 15.4 17.1 7.3 10.0 0.00 0.00 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
F: 
N=32
M: 
N=32
F: 
N=25
M: 
N=30 F M
F: 
N=32
M: 
N=32
F: 
N=30
M: 
N=25 F M F M F M
Abstract 5.8 5.4 2.6 6.2 0.02 n.s. 14.9 15.7 6.5 5.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 n.s.
Leisure 5.0 1.7 2.4 2.9 n.s. 0.09 16.1 16.5 4.8 5.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.s. n.s.
No Leisure 5.0 3.4 1.3 3.3 n.s. n.s. 14.9 17.9 5.4 5.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 n.s.
All 5.3 3.5 2.1 4.1 0.04 n.s. 15.3 16.7 5.6 5.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 n.s.
Note: p levels above 0.1 are marked as n.s.
Specialization task:
Mann-Whitney p: 
advantaged versus 
disadvantaged player
Mann-Whitney p: 
advantaged versus 
disadvantaged player
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Note: p levels above 0.1 are marked as n.s.
Control  (n=55)
Advantaged player Disadvantaged player
Spouses Control
Spouses Control
Spouses (n=64) Control  
(n=55)
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Spouses (n=64) Control  (n=55)
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Disadvantaged playerAdvantaged player
Spouses (n=64)
Control  
(n=55) Spouses (n=64)
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TABLE 6: The effect of investment framing on the efficiency of decisions  
 
Baseline:
Spouses Control
Spouses 
(n=64)
Control  
(n=55)
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Spouses 
(n=64)
Control  
(n=55)
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Abstract 77.3% 52.9% 0.00 76.5% 50.6% 0.00 n.s. n.s.
Leisure 81.2% 42.6% 0.00 82.7% 37.6% 0.00 n.s. n.s.
No Leisure 83.8% 43.8% 0.00 84.4% 39.9% 0.00 n.s. n.s.
All 80.7% 46.4% 0.00 81.2% 42.7% 0.00 n.s. n.s.
Spouses Control
Spouses 
(n=64)
Control  
(n=55)
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Spouses 
(n=64)
Control  
(n=55)
Mann-
Whitney p: 
Spouses 
versus 
Control
Abstract 71.9% 77.4% n.s. 76.6% 30.7% 0.00 n.s. 0.00
Leisure 81.1% 86.5% n.s. 81.4% 25.3% 0.00 n.s. 0.00
No Leisure 78.9% 88.2% n.s. 82.1% 27.3% 0.00 n.s. 0.00
All 77.3% 84.0% n.s. 80.1% 27.7% 0.00 n.s. 0.00
* Test results are the same when tests are done seperately for men and for women
Mann-Whitney p: 
advantaged versus 
disadvantaged player*
Note: p levels above 0.1 are marked as n.s.
Mann-Whitney p: 
advantaged versus 
disadvantaged player*
Note: p levels above 0.1 are marked as n.s.
Specialization task:
Advantaged player Disadvantaged player
* Test results are the same when tests are done seperately for men and for women
Advantaged player Disadvantaged player
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APPENDIX A: Instructions (translated from French) 
 
Welcome	
	
The	study	in	which	you	are	going	to	participate	aims	at	studying	economic	behavior.		More	precisely,	we	
are	interested	in	economic	decisions	in	couples.	
During	this	study,	we	will	ask	you	to	respond	to	questions	or	to	do	simple	tasks.	Little	by	little,	we	will	
give	you	over	the	course	of	the	study	instructions	about	these.	These	instructions	are	simple.	If	you	pay	
close	attention,	you	can	earn	a	significant	amount	of	money.	Your	earnings	will	be	paid	out	to	you	in	
cash	at	the	end	of	the	study.	
This	study	is	financed	through	public	research	funding.	Please	note	that	there	are	no	right	or	wrong	
answers	for	the	questions	we	will	pose	you.	We	just	wish	to	observe	how	you	and	your	partner	behave.	
This	 study	 consists	 of	 multiple	 parts	 that	 have	 differing	 “rules”.	 In	 each	 part	 you	 will	 be	 exposed	 to	
multiple	situations.	Each	of	them	will	be	explained	to	you	in	detail.	You	will	then	be	asked	to	either	take	
a	decision,	answer	a	question	or	do	a	task.	All	of	your	actions	will	allow	you	to	earn	Francs	Toulousains	
(FT).	Your	earnings	 in	Francs	Toulousain	depend	also	on	the	decisions	of	your	partner,	boy-friend,	girl-
friend,	husband,	wife,...	From	now	on	we	will	simply	refer	to	him	or	her	as	your	‘partner’.		
	
At	the	end	of	the	study,	the	computer	will	randomly	select	one	situation	from	each	part,	for	final	payout.	
You	will	then	be	privately	informed	about	your	total	earnings	in	FT	for	the	whole	study.	
	
Your	total	earnings	in	FT	will	be	converted	to	euros	and	paid	out	to	you.	The	exchange	rate	between	FT	
and	euros	is:	
	
1	euro	for	20	FT	
	
We	 inform	 you	 that	 in	 this	 study	 the	 earning	 possibilities	 in	 the	different	 situations	will	 be	 either	 the	
same	 for	 the	 man	 and	 the	 woman,	 or	 there	 will	 be	 an	 advantage	 for	 the	 	 [treatment	 	 “women	
advantaged”:	woman]	[treatment	“	men	advantaged”:	man].	
Please	 note	 that	 your	 decisions	 and	 thus	 your	 earnings	 are	 individual,	 private	 and	 anonymous.	 Your	
earnings	will	 be	paid	out	 to	 you	 individually	 and	 seperately,	 at	 the	end	of	 this	 study.	 Specifically	 your	
partner	will	have	no	possibility	to	find	out	about	your	decisions	and	your	earnings.	The	same	holds	for	
any	other	participant	in	this	study.	
Your	decisions	and	your	earnings	will	be	perfectly	anonymous.	To	preserve	your	anonymity,	a	personal	
identification	number	has	been	assigned	 to	 you:	 you	 find	 this	number	on	 the	 small	 piece	of	paper	on	
your	table.	The	link	between	this	number	and	your	name	will	be	used	only	once,	in	your	presence,	at	the	
moment	of	payout.	In	fact,	you	will	have	to	present	this	number	at	the	end	of	the	study	to	receive	your	
payment.	We	will	 thus	 have	no	means	 to	 later	 link	 the	 information	 collected	during	 this	 study	with	 a	
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name,	since	we	will	only	keep	your	personal	identification	number	in	our	files.	You	should	thus	feel	free	
to	take	any	decision	you	want,	without	fear	that	it	will	be	revealed	to	whoever,	not	even	your	partner.	
Furthermore,	we	placed	on	your	tables	a	sheet	of	paper.	You	can	use	 it	at	any	moment	 for	notes.	We	
remind	you	that	you	are	not	allowed	to	speak	with	other	participants	at	any	moment	during	the	study	.	If	
you	have	a	question	or	if	something	is	not	clear	to	you,	please	raise	your	hand.	
We	will	now	start	with	the	first	part	of	the	study.	We	ask	you	to	click	on	the	button	“next”	if	you	have	
not	already	done	so.	
	
Part	1	
	
We	will	start	the	first	part	that	will	consist	of	two	situations.	Lets	start	with	situation	1.	
	
Situation	1	
In	 this	 first	 situation,	we	will	allocate	 to	each	of	you	20	tokens,	 thus	40	tokens	 for	each	couple.	These	
tokens	 can	be	used	 to	 earn	 some	 FT.	 For	 this	 you	will	 have	 to	 take	 a	 simple	 and	 abstract	 investment	
decision.	You	have	the	choice	of	investing	your	tokens,	or	part	of	them	in	an	option	A	and/or	in	an	option	
B.	 Your	 earnings	 in	 FT	will	 depend	on	 your	 own	 investment	 decision	 but	 also	 on	 the	 decision	 of	 your	
partner.	
The	earnings	generated	by	each	option	will	be	shown	on	your	computer	screen	in	a	few	minutes.	
You	will	have	to	take	your	decision,	which	means	the	number	of	tokens	to	invest	in	the	option	A	and/or	
in	 the	option	B,	without	communicating	with	your	partner.	Thus,	without	knowing	what	he	or	she	will	
choose.	We	will	later	ask	you	what	you	believe	that	your	partner	did.	
For	 the	previously	mentioned	privacy	 reasons,	 you	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 find	our	 about	 the	decisions	of	
your	 partner,	 not	 even	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 study.	 Equally,	 your	 partner	will	 have	 no	way	 to	 know	 your	
decision,	even	at	the	end	of	the	study.		
We	remind	you	that	we	are	here	in	the	first	situation	of	the	first	part,	and	that	at	the	end	of	the	study	
one	situation	from	each	part	will	be	randomly	selected	for	your	payment	(that	means	that	your	earnings	
in	FT	from	that	situation	will	be	converted	to	euros).	Each	of	your	decisions	is	thus	important	since	it	can	
be	selected	for	payment.	
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You	will	now	see	a	summary	of	the	instructions	and	of	the	earnings	of	each	option	on	your	screen.	We	
will	now	distribute	a	 form	with	a	 short	question.	Please	answer	 this	question	with	 respect	 to	 this	 first	
situation.	Take	your	time	to	respond.	Do	not	hesitate	to	ask	questions.	Please	wait	for	us	to	pass	at	your	
table	before	clicking	on	the	button	‘”next”.	
	
Summary	on	screen:	
You	and	your	partner	have	20	tokens	each.	
	
You	and	your	partner	can	invest	the	number	of	tokens	you	want	in	an	option	A	and/or	an	option	B.	
	
Each	token	invested	by	yourself	in	the	option	A	generates	for	you	10	FT.	
Each	token	invested	by	your	partner	in	the	option	A	generates	for	him/her	10	FT.	
	
Each	token	invested	in	the	option	B	generates	for	you	6	FT	and	generates	6	FT	for	your	partner.	
Each	token	invested	by	your	partner	in	the	option	B	generates	for	you	6	FT	and	generates	6	FT	for	your	
partner.	
	
Decision	screen	(for	detailed	layout	see	Appendix	B):	
option	A:	___	
option	B:	___	
	
Questionnaire	screen	after	decision:	
What	do	you	think:	how	much	has	your	partner	put	in:	
	
option	A:	___	
option	B:	___	
	
(10	FT	for	each	correct	answer,	plus/minus	2	tokens)	
	
Situation	2	
	
We	will	now	start	the	second	situation	of	the	first	part.	This	situation	is	similar	to	the	preceding	one.	You	
will	have	again	20	tokens	each,	that	means	40	tokens	per	couple.	But	the	earnings	associated	with	the	
investment	decision	A	are	now	more	advantageous	for	the	[treatment		“women	advantaged”	:	women]	
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[treatment	“	men	advantaged”:	men].	Those	associated	with	the	investment	decision	B	did	not	change.	
The	details	of	the	earnings	from	each	option	will	be	shown	on	your	screen	in	a	moment.	
We	remind	you	that	we	are	here	in	the	second	situation	of	the	first	part,	and	that	at	the	end	of	the	study	
one	situation	from	this	part	will	be	randomly	selected	for	final	payment.	
We	also	remind	you	that	you	will	not	be	able	to	find	out	about	the	decision	of	your	partner,	not	even	at	
the	end	of	the	study.		
The	details	concerning	the	earnings	from	each	option	appear	now	on	your	screen.	Please	respond	to	the	
questions	concerning	the	second	situation	on	the	form	that	we	distributed	to	you	previously.	Please	wait	
that	we	pass	by	your	place	before	clicking	on	“next”.	
	
	
Summary	on	screen:	
You	and	your	partner	have	each	20	tokens.	
	
You	and	your	partner	can	invest	the	number	of	tokens	you	want	in	an	option	A	and/or	an	option	B.	
	
If	you	are	a	man	(dependent	on	treatment:	woman):	
Each	token	invested	in	the	option	A	generates	for	you	13	FT.	
If	you	are	a	woman	(dependent	on	treatment:	man):	
Each	token	invested	in	the	option	A	generates	for	you	10	FT.	
	
Whether	 you	 are	 man	 or	 woman,	 each	 token	 invested	 in	 the	 option	 B	 generates	 for	 you	 6	 FT	 and	
generates	6	FT	for	your	partner.	
	
Decision	screen	(for	detailed	layout	see	Appendix	B):	
option	A:	___	
option	B:	___	
Questionnaire	screen	after	decision:	
What	do	you	think:	how	much	has	your	partner	put	in:	
	
option	A:	___	
option	B:	___	
	
(10	FT	for	each	correct	answer,	plus/minus	2	tokens)	
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Part	2	
	
We	start	the	second	part	that	will	also	consist	of	two	situations.	However	there	will	be	no	more	tokens.	
From	now	on,	we	will	give	you	the	opportunity	to	work	to	earn	FT.	This	“work”	is	simple	and	abstract.	
We	start	with	the	first	situation.	
Situation	1	
	
You	 and	 your	 partner	 will	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 work	 on	 two	 identical	 tasks	 that	 however	 generate	
different	 types	 of	 earnings:	 task	 A	 and	 task	 B.	 You	will	 each	 have	 5	minutes	 time	 and	will	 be	 paid	 in	
proportion	to	the	time	that	you	will	spend	on	either	task.	
Concretely	the	work	will	consist	in	typing	phone	numbers	that	will	be	shown	on	your	screen.	The	gains	
from	each	task	are	the	following:	
	 If	you	work	on	task	A,	you	earn	40	FT	per	minute.	
If	 you	 work	 on	 task	 B,	 you	 earn	 24	 FT	 per	minute	 and	 your	 partner	 will	 also	 earn	 24	 FT	 per	
minute.		
	
We	remind	you	that	you	will	be	paid	based	on	the	total	amount	of	time	that	you	will	spend	on	each	task	
during	these	5	minutes	and	not	based	on	the	number	of	phone	numbers	that	you	type.	
You	 also	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 distract	 yourself,	which	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 any	 earnings	 in	 FT.	On	 your	
screen	you	have	several	entertainment	activities	at	your	disposition.	For	example	games,	journals	and	a	
web	browser.	We	inform	you	that	you	cannot	use	the	web	browser	for	communication.	
Your	partner	 is	 in	exactly	 the	same	situation	as	you	and	can	work	on	 the	 tasks	A,	B	or	distract	him	or	
herself.	
We	will	now	distribute	a	 short	 summary	of	 these	 instructions,	with	a	 short	question.	Please	 take	your	
time	to	read	these	and	to	respond	to	the	question.	
--	
To	 summarize,	 you	 and	 your	 partner	 will	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 work	 to	 earn	 money	 or	 to	 use	 a	
distraction.	Note	that	you	will	be	paid	by	rounded	intervals	of	15	seconds.	If	you	work	for	example	for	8	
seconds	or	more	on	a	task,	we	will	consider	that	you	worked	for	15	seconds.	If	you	work	for	7	seconds	or	
less	on	a	task	we	will	consider	that	you	did	not	work	on	this	task.	
You	will	have	to	act	without	communicating	with	your	partner,	and	thus	without	knowing	what	he	or	she	
will	choose.	We	will	afterwards	ask	you	what	you	think	that	your	partner	did	in	this	situation.	
For	 the	previously	mentioned	privacy	 reasons,	 you	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 find	our	 about	 the	decisions	of	
your	partner,	not	even	at	 the	end	of	 the	study.	Similarly,	your	partner	will	have	no	way	 to	know	your	
decision,	even	at	the	end	of	the	study.		
You	will	now	have	a	few	minutes	to	familiarize	yourself	with	the	different	tasks:	task	A,	task	B	and	the	
distraction	 task.	 This	 test	period	will	 not	be	paid.	Click	on	 the	different	buttons	on	 the	 left	 to	explore	
each	of	the	options:	try	to	type	some	numbers,	look	at	the	different	distraction	options.	Notice	that	you	
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can	 switch	 at	 any	 moment	 between	 the	 different	 options	 and	 that	 you	 can	 come	 back	 to	 the	 same	
option	multiple	times.	
Before	this	test	period	a	screen	with	a	summary	of	these	instructions	will	appear	on	your	screen.	Look	at	
these	instructions	by	clicking	on	“next”	to	start	the	test	period.	
	
Summary	on	screen:	
You	 have	 5	minutes.	 You	 can	work	 on	 task	 A,	 on	 task	 B	 or	 use	 the	 distraction	 task.	 You	will	 be	 paid	
proportionally	 to	 the	 time	 that	 you	will	 spend	 on	 each	 of	 the	 two	 tasks.	 Your	 partner	 is	 in	 the	 same	
situation	as	you.	
	
Working	on	task	A	generates	for	you	40	FT	per	minute.	
Working	on	task	B	generates	for	you	24	FT	per	minute	and	generates	24	FT	per	minute	for	your	partner.	
	
Decision	screen	(for	detailed	layout	see	Appendix	B):	
task	A:		
task	B:		
distraction	task:	
Questionnaire	screen	after	decision:	
What	do	you	think:	how	much	time	did	your	partner	spend	on:	
	
task	A:	___	
task	B:	___	
distraction	task:	___	
	
(10	FT	for	each	correct	answer,	plus/minus	20	seconds)	
	
Situation	2	
	
The	second	situation	is	similar	to	the	previous	situation.	You	have	again	5	minutes	time	to	work	on	task	
A,	 B	 or	 to	 use	 the	 distraction.	 However	 note:	 the	 earnings	 in	 FT	 generated	 by	 task	 A	 are	 now	more	
advantageous	for	the	[treatment		“women	advantaged”	:	women]	[treatment	“	men	advantaged”:	men].	
Those	 associated	with	 task	 B	 have	 not	 changed.	 The	 details	 of	 the	 earnings	 from	 each	 option	will	 be	
shown	on	your	screen	in	a	moment.	
The	distraction	task	does	not	generate	any	earnings.	
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We	remind	you	that	we	are	here	in	the	second	situation	of	the	second	part,	and	that	at	the	end	of	the	
study	one	situation	from	this	part	will	be	randomly	selected	for	final	payment.	
We	also	remind	you	that	you	will	not	be	able	to	find	out	about	the	decision	of	your	partner,	not	even	at	
the	end	of	the	study.		
The	details	concerning	the	earnings	from	each	option	appear	now	on	your	screen.	When	you	are	ready	
click	on	“next”	to	start.	
	
Summary	on	screen:	
The	situation	is	the	same	as	previously.	You	have	5	minutes	but	the	earnings	changed.		
	
If	you	are	a	man	(dependent	on	treatment:	woman):	
Working	on	task	A	generates	for	you	52	FT	per	minute.	
If	you	are	a	woman	(dependent	on	treatment:	man):	
Working	on	task	A	generates	for	you	40	FT	per	minute.	
	
Whether	you	are	man	or	woman,	working	on	task	B	generates	for	you	24	FT	per	minute	and	generates	
24	FT	per	minute	for	your	partner.	
	
Decision	screen	(for	detailed	layout	see	Appendix	B):	
task	A:		
task	B:		
distraction	task:	
Questionnaire	screen	after	decision:	
What	do	you	think:	how	much	time	did	your	partner	spend	on:	
	
task	A:	___	
task	B:	___	
distraction	task:	___	
	
(10	FT	for	each	correct	answer,	plus/minus	20	seconds)	
	
Part	3	
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We	 start	 the	 third	 part	 that	 will	 also	 consist	 of	 two	 situations.	 This	 part	 will	 be	 very	 similar	 to	 the	
previous,	 however	 you	 will	 no	 longer	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 use	 the	 distraction	 task.	 You	 and	 your	
partner	have	each	5	minutes	 and	 you	will	 be	paid	proportional	 to	 the	 total	 time	 you	 spend	on	either	
task.	
We	start	with	the	first	situation.	
	
Situation	1	
	
The	gains	from	each	task	are	the	following:	
	 If	you	work	on	task	A,	you	earn	40	FT	per	minute.	
If	 you	 work	 on	 task	 B,	 you	 earn	 24	 FT	 per	minute	 and	 your	 partner	 will	 also	 earn	 24	 FT	 per	
minute.		
We	remind	you	that	we	are	here	in	the	first	situation	of	the	third	part,	and	that	at	the	end	of	the	study	
one	situation	from	this	part	will	be	randomly	selected	for	final	payment.	
We	also	remind	you	that	you	will	not	be	able	to	find	out	about	the	decision	of	your	partner,	not	even	at	
the	end	of	the	study.		
The	details	concerning	the	earnings	from	each	option	appear	now	on	your	screen.	When	you	are	ready	
click	on	“next”	to	start.	
	
Summary	on	screen:	
You	have	5	minutes.	You	can	work	on	task	A	or	on	task	B.	You	will	be	paid	proportionally	to	the	time	that	
you	will	spend	on	each	of	the	two	tasks.	Your	partner	is	in	the	same	situation	as	you.	
	
Working	on	task	A	generates	for	you	40	FT	per	minute.	
Working	on	task	B	generates	for	you	24	FT	per	minute	and	generates	24	FT	per	minute	for	your	partner.	
	
Decision	screen	(for	detailed	layout	see	Appendix	B):	
task	A:		
task	B:		
Questionnaire	screen	after	decision:	
What	do	you	think:	how	much	time	did	your	partner	spend	on:	
	
task	A:	___	
task	B:	___	
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(10	FT	for	each	correct	answer,	plus/minus	20	seconds)	
	
Situation	2	
	
The	 second	 situation	 is	 similar	 to	 the	previous.	 The	earnings	 in	 FT	 generated	by	 task	A	are	now	more	
advantageous	for	the	[treatment		“women	advantaged”	:	women]	[treatment	“	men	advantaged”:	men].	
Those	associated	with	task	B	have	not	changed.		
The	details	concerning	the	earnings	from	each	option	appear	now	on	your	screen.	When	you	are	ready	
click	on	“next”	to	start.	
	
Summary	on	screen:	
The	situation	is	the	same	as	previously.	You	have	5	minutes	but	the	earnings	changed.		
	
If	you	are	a	man	(dependent	on	treatment:	woman):	
Working	on	task	A	generates	for	you	52	FT	per	minute.	
	
If	you	are	a	woman	(dependent	on	treatment:	man):	
Working	on	task	A	generates	for	you	40	FT	per	minute.	
	
Whether	you	are	man	or	woman,	working	on	task	B	generates	for	you	24	FT	per	minute	and	generates	
24	FT	per	minute	for	your	partner.	
	
Decision	screen	(for	detailed	layout	see	Appendix	B):	
task	A:		
task	B:		
Questionnaire	screen	after	decision:	
What	do	you	think:	how	much	time	did	your	partner	spend	on:	
	
task	A:	___	
task	B:	___	
	
(10	FT	for	each	correct	answer,	plus/minus	20	seconds)	
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Part	4		
	
We	now	start	the	4th	part	in	which	you	will	no	longer	have	to	work.	You	will	simply	have	to	take	a	series	
of	decisions.	
The	instructions	will	appear	on	the	screen.	I	will	read	them	out	loud.	Please	read	them	at	the	same	time	
and	do	not	click	on	“next”	immediately.	
	
You	will	take	a	series	of	decisions.	
Each	numbered	line,	proposes	two	possible	divisions	of	FT	between	you	and	your	partner.	
For	each	line,	you	have	to	choose	one	of	the	two	divisions:	the	option	A	or	the	option	B.	
Take	for	example	the	first	line.	In	option	A,	both	partners	earns	100	FT.	In	option	B,	you	earn	300	FT	for	
yourself	and	your	partner	earns	0	FT.	
For	each	 line,	you	will	 thus	have	to	check	one	of	the	boxes.	At	the	end	of	the	study,	we	will	 randomly	
select	 on	 of	 the	 line	 for	 final	 payment.	We	will	 then	 randomly	 select	which	 of	 the	 two	 decisions	 in	 a	
couple	(the	division	chosen	by	the	man	or	by	the	woman)	will	be	applied.	
Please	take	your	decisions	now	and	please	do	not	hesitate	to	ask	us	questions.	
	
Part	5	
	
The	 computer	will	 now	make	 the	 random	 draws	 concerning	 each	 part	 of	 the	 study	 to	 calculate	 your	
individual	earnings.	
Your	individual	earnings	will	appear	on	the	screen.	
	
---	
You	now	know	your	individual	earnings.	Your	partner	will	not	be	informed	about	them.	
	
Your	earnings	are	individual:	you	will	receive	your	earnings	separately	 in	 individual	envelops.	However,	
you	have	the	possibility	to	decide	to	transfer	your	individual	earnings	or	part	of	them	to	a	joint	envelope	
that	is	given	to	the	couple.	We	call	this	the	“joint	account”.	
You	can	now	discuss	with	your	partner	the	contributions	of	each	of	you	to	this	joint	account.	
To	 do	 so	 you	 have	 access	 to	 a	 “chat”	 tool.	 Concretely	 you	 can	 write	messages	 for	 your	 partner	 in	 a	
window	 on	 your	 screen.	 He	 or	 she	 can	 then	 respond	 to	 you	 with	 the	 same	 tool.	 Each	 of	 you	 can,	
whenever	he	wants,	fill	in	the	amount	that	he	or	she	wishes	to	transfer	to	the	joint	account.	
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Whenever	 you	 want,	 you	 fill	 in	 the	 amount	 that	 you	 want	 to	 transfer	 to	 the	 joint	 account	 and	 your	
partner	will	do	the	same.	We	will	then	ask	you	if	you	agree	with	the	proposal	by	your	partner.	The	chat	
phase	will	continue	until	you	agree	on	the	amount	to	transfer	to	the	joint	account.	
All	of	this	is	summarized	on	the	following	screen.	Click	on	“next”	to	access	the	chat.	
End	
	
The	study	is	now	finished.	
We	now	ask	you	fill	out	this	final	questionnaire	that	will	allow	us	to	have	more	information	about	you.	
This	 information	 is	 very	 important	 for	 the	 scientific	quality	of	 the	 study.	 If	 certain	questions	 seem	too	
indiscreet,	we	prefer	 that	 you	do	not	 respond	 to	 them	 than	 to	 respond	 falsely.	However	 rest	 assured	
that	your	responses	stay	completely	anonymous	and	private.	Even	your	partner	will	not	be	informed	of	
them.	You	will	receive	100	FT	for	taking	the	time	to	respond	to	this	questionnaire.	
When	you	are	 finished	with	 the	questionnaire,	 you	 can	 return	 to	 the	 reception	 room	 to	wait	 for	 final	
payout.	Make	sure	to	keep	your	personal	identification	number	with	you.	
We	will	call	you	one	by	one	to	give	you	your	payment	and	to	ask	you	to	sign	a	receipt.	If	you	wish	you	
can	stay	after	payout	to	lean	more	about	this	research	project	and	the	questions	we	want	to	investigate	
in	this	study.	
Thank	you	very	much	for	your	participation.	
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APPENDIX B: Decision screens 
 
 
  
  
Specialization	task:	Abstract	treatment	
41	
	
 
 
 
Specialization	task:	Effort	treatment	
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Specialization	task:	Time	treatment	
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Payout screen in treatment: public 
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Chat	screen	in	treatment	public	(male	version)	
	
 
